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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LEO PORTER and NORA PORTER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 9151

-vs.HYRUM: PRICE,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT·s BRIEF

ADMISSION OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the facts as stated by the
appellants except in the particulars and details set forth
in respondent's statement of facts hereafter.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Price, the respondent, has no recollection of the
route which he followed from Lincoln Avenue and
Twenty-Fourth Street, and while it is agreed that he
drove fifteen or sixteen blocks through traffic and negotiated an undetermined number of traffic control devices,
the exact route he followed and exact number of semaphore signals is unknown. (Transcript 91, 92, 93). It is
also agreed that Mr. Price had had insulin reactions prior
to the time of the accident, however, none of them were
severe and none were of such a nature or in such a degree
as to incapacitate him or make him unable to operate an
automobile. (Tr. 166, 167, 174, 208, 155, 156) Further,
he had always experienced warning symptoms at the onset of the relatively minor insulin reactions which he had
experienced in the past, and had controlled them by candy
or food. He had no warnings at the onset of the insulin
reaction from which this accident resulted, although he
did have either candy or an orange available in his automobile. (Tr. 93, 94, 167, 170, 173, 174) The evidence is
further clear from the medical experts who were called,
that it is possible for a diabetic at the onset of an insulin
reaction to lose voluntary control and thus be unable to
control the reaction even though means to do so might
be at hand, and it is possible for a diabetic to have a
reaction even though he follows medical directions and
cares for himself in every respect. (Tr. 139, 146, 147,
158, 128, 129) l\1:r. Price did not testify that he had a
clear recollection of taking 65 or 70 units of insulin on
4
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the morning of the accident, but to the contrary testified
that he had a clear recollection of taking the prescribed
dosage, although he could not recall at the time of the
deposition the exact amount of such dosage, since his
dosage had been changed from time to time as his condition varied over the seventeen years during which he
had suffered from diabetes. The fact that the dosage
was subject to change was confirmed by the doctor who
cared for his diabetic condition over the past three years,
Dr. Drew Petersen. (Tr.161, 165, 168, 169, 175)
His story with respect to driving the automobile
without a conscious recollection through the traffic
situation described was said to be a reasonable thing to
expect a diabetic to do in an insulin reaction by both of
the medical experts called. (Tr. 122, 123, 139, 140) Dr.
Petersen also testified that Mr. Price was well regulated
at the time of the accident and that it was possible for a
well regulated diabetic to undergo an insulin reaction
which might not have warning symptoms and which might
not be subject to voluntary control, however, that such a
reaction as described here would be unusual or rare.
(Tr.156, 158) He further testified that the same thing
could happen to a person having a fainting spell, such
as a woman might experience during her menstrual
period. (Tr. 160)
Contrary to counsel's statement of facts in appellant's brief, Dr. 0. N. Lewis (Tr. 120) did not diagnose
defendant's condition as resulting from more insulin than
was needed on the day in question. He merely indicated
that this might be a cause of such a condition.
5
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It must be conceded by appellant that Dr. 0. N.
Lewis, at no time, treated or examined defendant, and
while he said it was unlikely defendant would not have
premonitory symptoms of the reaction, he certainly did
not say that it was impossible for this to be the case.
(Tr.121).
Both medical experts called, testified that their diabetic patients drive automobiles. (Tr. 125, 141) It is important to further note that there was absolutely no evidence to the effect that defendant had anything but a
normal, usual days activities as to eating habits, working
and taking of medication. The evidence on this point
is supplied by Mr. Price and his wife, Bonnie Price, both
of whom testify that he followed his normal routine for
an average day. (Tr. 169-172, 205). It is to be further
noted that l\fr. Price took a daily test of his urine to
ascertain whether his condition was well regulated and
that he performed this test on the day of the accident
as was his usual practice ( Tr. 168) and found nothing out
of the ordinary.
The evidence is also uncontradicted on the point that
all persons who observed him on the day of the accident
found him to be normal in appearance prior to the time
he drove his car into Ogden. These include Kenneth W.
McClannon (Tr. 191) and Tony Ledesma (Tr. 197, 198),
who rode in the car pool with him. However, immediately
prior to the accident an acquaintance, Robert A. Call,
observed him driving his automobile in an erratic manner
and testified that he appeared to be in a stupor. (Tr.ll)
6
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All the witnesses who observed him at the scene gave
similar testimony. (Tr. 32, 38, 66, 68, 75, 76) And all oi
the symptoms described were stated by the medical experts to be consistant with a diagnosis of insulin reaction.
(Tr.126, 136, 137)
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I.
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
POINT IL
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING INSTRUCTIONS ON UN AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS.
POINT IlL
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
POINT V.
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.

7
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The law has been clearly stated on numerous occac
sions by this Court with respect to the province of this
Court in reviewing the verdict of a jury. A typical holding is found in the case of Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2nd,
381, 275 Pac. 2nd 680, the Court saying~
"The plaintiff having won a judgment below,
the verdict is protected by bulwark of rules firmly
established in our law. First, by the general prop=
osition that the judgment and proceedings in thiS
lower court are presumptively correct with the
burden upon defendant to show errore Second,
where a trial judge has passed upon a question
and a jury presumably fair and impartial ha~
made a finding, while such is not controling, it i8
at least entitled to some consideration and should
not be wholly ignored in reviewing the situation
and attempting to see as objectively as possible
whether reasonable minds might so conclude.
Third, that the Court must review the evidence
together with every inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and similarly must consider any lack or failure
of evidence in the same light, which we do in reviewing the facts here."
Cited in support of this position are the following
cases: Burton v. Z.C.M.I., Utah, :249 Pac. 2nd 514;
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
Utah, 239 Pac. 2nd 163; Great Ameri·can Indemnity Company v. Berryessa, Utah, 248 Pac. 2nd 367; McCollum v.
Clothier, Utah, 2-ll Pac. 2nd 468. If, therefore, it is found
that the jury in this case concluded as reasonable minds
might conclude, based upon the evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to defendant, and thus arrived at
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its verdict, such verdict should not be reversed by this
Court. The jury, as the triers of fact, are best able to observe the witnesses and their demeanor and to view the
trial proceedings first hand so that they are in a much
more advantageous position to determine the facts than
is this Appellate Court.
While it is true that Mr. Price had been a diabetic
for seventeen years, appellant makes an incorrect assertion in the statement that he had suffered several insulin
reactions which if not checked would have caused him to
lose consciousness. This conclusion appears nowhere
in the record, the only evidence being that 1\Ir. Price had
suffered prior reactions of mild or moderate degree,
all of which had been preceeded by warning or premonitory symptoms and none of which had incapacitated him.
This testimony was elicited from l\Ir. Price, his wife,
Mrs. Bonnie Price, and his physician, Dr. Drew Petersen.
(Tr.155, 156, 166, 208) It is further testified that he was
a conscientious and well regulated diabetic. (Tr. 135, 136,
140, 167, 168, 170, 203, 204, 211) He had no reason to
think that he might have such a reaction, having had none
in the past, and such an occurance being rare according
to all medical evidence in this case. ( Tr. 121, 123, 156)
Dr. Drew Petersen, his physician and a specialist in internal medicine and diabetes, testified that a diabetic
can, however, have such a reaction even though he is
careful and conscientious in the care of his condition.
(Tr.158) However, as the doctor testified, a similar loss
of control of an automobile could come from any of a
number of reasons, including occurances such as faint9
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ing during a menstrual period by a woman driver. (Tr,
159, 160) Counsel's statement that Mr. Price admitted
to taking an overdose is incorrect and has been discussed
in the statement of facts. In fact, Mr. Price testified
clearly and unequivocally that he took on the day of the
accident and, in fact, always took the prescribed amount
of insulin on which he was regulated and that he did not
change the amount of his dosage without first consulting
his doctor. This was born out by Dr. Petersen< (Tr. 135,
136, 140, 141,169, 175) :Mr. Price testified further that
he could not recall the exact amount of insulin on which
he was regulated at the time of the accident, as his dosage
had varied over the many years which he had suffered
from the disease, but that he did take the prescribed
amount. (Tr. 163,169, 175)
The evidence is further clear that in the absence of
some unusual activity of eating, working or medication
there would be no reason to anticipate such a reaction,
and Mr. Price had no such variance on the day of the
accident. (Tr. 169-172, 205, 145) There is nothing to in~
dicate that Mr. Price's story was either inaccurate or
false, and, in fact, both medical experts testified that his
story, including the negotiating of traffic and traffic controls, was reasonable and could well have happened if he
were suffering from an insulin reaction. (Tr. 122, 139,
140) There is no prohibition in Utah Law against a sufferer from the disease of diabetes operating an automobile. The only applicable code section is found at 41-6-64
(C) Utah Code Annotated 1953.
10
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"It is unlawful and punishable as provided
in subdivision D of this section for any person who
is an habitual user of or under the influence of an
narcotic drug, or who is under the influence of any
other drug, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive a vehicle
within this State."
The application for operators' license in the State
of Utah specifically asks the question:
"Have you ever suffered from epilepsy, heart
trouble, paralysis, fainting or dizzy spells. Have
you ever been addicted to narcotic drugs or intoxicating liquors~"
It makes absolutely no reference to diabetes, the
clear inference being that a controlled diabetic is a fit
and proper person to operate an automobile. Appellant
argues that defendant might, because of his diabetic condition undergo an insulin reaction at any time. However,
respondent contends this line of argument is fallacious.
Followed to its ultimate conclusion it would prohibit
anyone from driving an automobile on the basis that
everyone knows that they will some day die, and that
because it is impossible to predict exactly where or in
what manner this unfortunate event will take place it
thus is conceivable that it could happen while operating
an automobile and, therefore, it is unsafe for anyone to
drive. Defendant and respondent in this case was clearly
a fit and able person to drive an automobile, having experienced no difficulties with his disease which would
give him any warning or indication that he might not be
able to properly operate an automobile. Further, even
11
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when he had undergone mild reactions in the past he had
had warning symptoms which would have allowed him
ample opportunity to pull an automobile off of the road,
to eat the organge which he always carried in his lunch
bucket on the way home from work (Tr.167, 170), to eat
candy which he customarily carried with him, or to take
other action which would avoid any mishap. The insulin
reaction which caused the accident in this case was entirely unforseeable and unforeseen and could have in no
way been guarded against by defendant in the exercise of
reasonable care.
Counsel cites several cases almost all of which deal
with the subject of epilepsy. It is to be noted that plaintiffs' own medical expert, Dr. Marvin 0. Lewis, testified
that epilepsy was not controlable to the same extent as
diabetes. (Tr. 126) It is also noted that epilepsy is one
of the diseases specifically referred to in the application
for Utah Driver's License. The text authorities and cases
supporting defendant's position that the accident under
the evidence in this case was unavoidable are numerous.
Under the heading, "Negligence as a Basis of Liability
for Injury - Liability for Unavoidable Accident," 5A
Am. Jur. Autos, Section 193, p. 346-347, is found the
following statement:
"It is essential to the existance of liability for
injuries caused by an automobile that there be
some negligence, son1e fault on the part of the
person sought to be held liable."
The subject is also covered in Article Two of the
Restatement of Torts which sets out the general propo-
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sition that a person can only be liable for his conscious
acts.
A current and exhaustive treatment of the subject
is found at 28 ALR 2nd, under the section cited below:
"Fainting or momentary loss of consciousness
while driving is a complete defense to an action
based on negligence ... if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable."
28 A.L.R. 2d, 35, § 15.
Under this annotation are cited numerous cases covering fainting spells, heart attacks, menstrual fainting~
~oughing spells, etco
"According to the great weight of authority))
an operator of a motor vehicle who becomes suddenly stricken by a fainting spell or otherwise
loses consciousness while driving, and for this
reason is unable to control the vehicle, is not
chargeable with negligence or gross negligence if
his loss of consciousness is due to an unforeseen
cause."
"Of course no fixed rule can be established
to determine when or under what circumstances
the driver must desist from driving a vehicle because of the danger of his losing consciousness,
but it seems that the courts are rather lenient in
this respect and it can certainly not be stated as a
general rule that a person who knows that he is
suffering from a heart condition or another illness which may cause his loss of consciousness at
some future time is automatically at fault if he
drives an automobile and, while doing so, loses
consciousness, thereby causing an accident." (Emphasis added.)
13
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28 A.L.R. 2d 22, § 3
Also in accord is 60 C.J.S. 1\Iotor Vehicle § 2640
A similar rule is stated in Blashfield, Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law.
". . . a motorist stricken by paralysis, overcome by poisonous gas, seized by a fit, or falling
asleep, who still continues to drive and, while
unconscious, causes injury to another, cannot be
held therefor unless he was reasonably aware that
he was about to lose consciousness to the extent
that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue driving."
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law § 656
(1948)
While many of the authorities would seem to include
the epileptic under the general classification thereby
allowing him the same defense as asserted by defendant
and respondent in this case, it is clear that epilepsy presents a much more difficult problem because of its
greater difficulty to control than diabetes. Countless
numbers of diabetics drive automobiles on the streets of
our cities every day, as do countless numbers of sufferers
from heart disease and other ailments which might
possibly result in unconsciousness. Doctors do not advise
them to desist from driving. (Tr. 125, 141)
The case of State 1.:. Olson, 160 Pac. 2nd 427, cited by
appellant is clearly distinguishable on two grounds. First,
that the defendant in tl1is case felt drowsy but continued
to drive, thereby having the warning symptoms referred
14
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to above, and second, that it was through a voluntary
act of defendant that she allowed herself to become overly
tired and from this her sleep and the accident resulted,
the conclusion being that by getting proper rest she
could have avoided this occurance. It is, therefore, respondent's position that this holding has no application
to the case at bar.
In conclusion it is therefore argued that it is clear
that a proper jury question of fact was raised under the
applicable authorities as to the law, that the jury found
the facts in favor of defendant, and properly returned
a verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING INSTRUCTIONS ON UN AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS.

Appellant challenges the instruction which is quoted
in appellant's brief and which was given as instruction
No. 8 by the Court. In order to properly evaluate this
instruction it must be construed as are all instructions
in context with all the other instructions given by the
Court in this case. In fact, this specific instruction was
given to the jury as part of instruction No. 22 given by
the Court.
" ... you are not to single out any sentence
or any individual point or instruction and ignore
the others, but you are to consider all the instructions, as a whole, and to regard each in the light
of all the others."
Instructions which bear directly or indirectly on instruction No. 8 as given include instructions No. 3, 5, 7,
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9, 10, 11 and 12, and the Court's attention is respectfully
directed to these instructions as transmitted in the Record
from the District Court. Instructions No. 9 and 10 bear
most directly on the problem at hand and we, therefore,
set forth hereafter instruction No. 8 on which error
is assigned, instruction No. 9 and instruction No. 10.
Instruction No. 8 :
"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents.
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in
such a manner that it cannot justly be said to have
been proximately caused by negligence as those
terms are herein defined. In the event a party is
damaged by an unavoidable accident, he has no
right to recover, since the law requires that a person be injured by the fault or negligence of another as a prerequisite to any right to recover
damages.''
Instruction No. 9 :
"A driver of an automobile who is stricken
by paralysis, seized by a fit or otherwise rendered
unconscious and who still continues to drive while
unconscious and causes damages or injury to another cannot be held responsible therefore unless
he was reasonbly aware that he was about to lose
consciousness to the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to continue driving."
Instruction No. 10 :
"You are instructed that fainting or loss of
consciousness while driving is a complete defens6
to an action based on negligence if such loss of
consciousness was not foreseeable. If you find
that defendant Hyrum Price was suffering from
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an unforeseen insulin reaction, resulting in a
fainting spell or loss of consciousness at the time
of this accident, then you must return a verdict
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs.
"On the other hand, if the insulin shock that
defendant suffered was forseeable and he could
have done something about it, and thereby avoided
the accident, then and in that event he would be
charged with negligence proximately causing the
accident"
While appellant summarily disposes of Nelson Vo
Lott, 17 Pac. 2nd, 272, with the statement that it is not
substantial authority for the instruction, we respectfully
invite the Court's attention to page 275 of this case. In
the Nelson v. Lott case appellant assigned as error thecourt's instruction No. 10 which read as follows:
"You are instructed that if you believe from
the evidence that the injury to plaintiff was a
result of unavoidable accident and that the defendant's negligence was not the cause thereof
your verdict should be in favor of defendant, no
cause of action."
The Court stated as follows:
"Appellant contends that the instruction is
contrary to law and misleading in that it assumes
that an unavoidable accident could be caused by
defendant's negligence. The instruction would
have been sufficient without the words, 'and that
the defendant's negligence was not the cause
thereof/
"However, the writer is inclined to think the
jury would interpret the instruction to mean that
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if they should believe the injury to the plaintiff
was a result of unavoidable accident and not of
negligence on the part of defendant, then verdict
should be in favor of defendant. We think the
word 'thereof' refers to the word 'injury' and not
the word 'accident.' While the instruction is open
to criticism we are of the opinion that it was not
prejudicial."
The case, therefore, seems to clearly sanction the
words "unavoidable accident" and the instruction with
relation to unavoidable accident as being a defense.
The subject is treated under the general heading "inevitable accident" in Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 1 Part II, § 635. Numerous cases
are cited in support of the unavoidable accident theory
and the words "unavoidable accident" and "inevitable
accident" are used throughout the cases and the text,
It is further noted that the Court spelled out in great
detail the applicable law in Instructions No. 9 and 10
as well as in Instruction No. 8 on which appellant assigns
error.
The cases of Karlburg v. Wesley Hospital and Nurse
Tra~ning School 323 Pac. 2nd 638 (Kansas); Paski.Z v.
Leigh Rich Corp., 340 Pac. 2nd 741, (Cal.), are both clearly distinguishable on the grounds of concurrent negligence together with the circumstance claimed to give rise
to the unavoidable accident and the question of foreseeability which was obviously decided in this case in favor
of defendant based on the evidence to which the Court
has been referred in preceeding sections of this brief,
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California has adopted the general rule with respect
to unavoidable accidents and non-liability of a non-negli=
gent defendant in the case of Ford v. Carew and English,
200 Pac. 2nd 828. Other cases in accord include Cohen
v. Petty, 65 F, 2d 820 (D.C. Circuit) 1955; Armstrong
Vo Cook, 227 N.W. 433, 138 A.L.R. 1396; Bridges v. Speer,
(Fla,) 79 So. 2d 679; Lehman v. Haynam, (Ohio) 133
N,E. 2d 97; LaVigne v. LaVigne (Oregon) 158 P. 2d 557.

In Prosser's generally recognized work on Torts, the
following statement is found~
"An unavoidable accident is an unintended
occurrance which could not have been prevented
by the exercise of reasonable care. In general,
under modern law there is no liability for unavoidable accident."
Prosser Torts, page 117.
"On the other hand a transitory unconsciousness or delirium due to illness commonly is regarded as a circumstance depriving the actor of
control over his conduct which will absolve him
from liability."
Prosser Torts, page 127 (2nd Edition 1955)
Appellant therefore urges that the instructions of
the Court considered as a whole were a clear and proper
statement of the law and that no error exists in thiSregard.
POINT IlL
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 'TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5.

Plaintiff claims error on the basis of the Court's failure to instruct the jury in accordance with plaintiffs,.
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requested instruction No. 5 which is set forth hereafter.
"If the defendant, Hyrum Price, knew that
because of his diabetic condition he was subject to
attacks in the course of which he was likely to lose
consciousness but nevertheless operated a motor
vehicle on a public highway and while in a state of
unconsciousness caused by his diabetic condition,
drove his automobile onto the wrong side of the
road and into the automobile in which plaintiff
Nora Porter was seated, causing damage to the
motor vehicle owned by Leo Porter and injury to
Nora Porter, you will find the defendant, Hyrum
Price, was negligent in causing the said collision
and will award judgment to the plaintiffs for such
damages and injuries as you find were caused by
and are the proximate result of defendant's negligence."
This general subject matter including the essential
elements of unavoidable accident, and foreseeability of
the occurance were covered in the Court's instructions
No.8, 9 and 10 which are quoted in the immediately preceeding section of this brief.
It is further noted that this instruction is faulty in
two respects. First, there is absolutely no evidence that
Hyrum Price knew "he was subject to attacks in the
course of which he was likely to lose consciousness" as no
such attacks had occurred in the past and, in fact, medical
evidence indicates that an occurance of the type which
resulted in the accident in this case is unusual or rare,
particularly where the diabetic was conscientious in his
care of himself and was well regulated as was the defendant, Mr. Price. Second, the requested instruction com20
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pletely omits the necessary element of foreseeability. All
of the authorities seem to be in accord on the proposition
that the unconsciousness must be reasonably foreseeable
or must be subject to being guarded against by the exercise of reasonable care.
"Fainting or momentary loss of consciousness
while driving is a complete defense to an action
based on negligence
if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable."
28 A.L.R. 2d 35 §15
In accord with this rule of law are authorities found
0

••

at~

5A Am. Jur. Prud. Auto§ 193 p. 346,347
28 A.L.R. 2d 22 § 3
60 C.J.S. Motor Veh. § 264
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law § 656
(1948)
Prosser, Torts, p.l17, 127 (2d ed.l955)
Cohen v. Petty, 65 F 2d 820
Armstrong v. Cook, 227 N.W. 433, 138 ALR 1396
Ford Vo Carew & English, (Cal.) 200 P, 2d 828
The Court's attention is drawn to the distinction
pointed out by respondent on appellant's claimed authority under State v. Olson (Utah) 160 P. 2d 427, under
Point I of this brief on the grounds of foreseeability and
that it was based on an at least partially voluntary act of
Defendant. With respect to Eleason v. Western Casualty
and Surety Co., 35 N.W. 2d p. 301, it is noted that at page
7 of appellant's brief where this case is also quoted appellant makes the following statement with respect to the
facts of the case :
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"It further appeared that the driver knew he
was subject to spells or seizures rendering him
unconscious although he did not know he had epilepsy."
This is entirely contrary to the facts of the instant
case as the evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that
defendant had no knowledge he was subject to unconsciousness as a result of his diabetic condition, and even
in the instances where he had undergone a mild insulin
reaction in the past he had experienced warning symptoms which would have been ample to allow him to avoid
the accident as it occurred in this case.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

Respondent again contends that the instructions of
the Court as given were a proper, clear and understandable statement of the law with respect to the issues of
this case. The essential elements of plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 9 as they comply with the applicable law
were covered by the instructions of the Court. The instruction as requested was faulty in two respects, both
of which relate to its non-conformance to the evidence
in this case.
First, the instruction includes the words "if he (defendant) allows himself to get into a condition where an
accident could happen without his being aware of it or
able to avoid it." There is no evidence that defendant
in any way failed to care for himself as he should have,
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and in fact, the evidence is overwhelming on the point
that defendant was conscientious and careful in his care
of his diabetic condition, that he exercised all usual and
reasonable precautions and that he carefully followed the
advice and instructions of his physician.
Second, the instruction went on to state as follows:
"and if you find the defendant suffered from diabetes, and in any manner did not properly care for
himself so as to allow himself to get into a physical condition where he could lose control of his
automobile while operating said automobile ... "
There is no evidence that defendant did not properly
care for himself and it is further to be noted that this
portion of the instruction is thoroughly covered by the
second paragraph of Instruction No. 10 as given by the
Court which reads as follows:
"on the other hand, if the insulin shock that defendant suffered was foreseeable and he could
have done something about it, and thereby avoided
the accident, then and in that event he would be
charged with negligence proximately causing the
accident.''
The distinction drawn between the only authority
cited by appellant in support of this position, that being
State v. Olson (Utah) 160 P. 2d 427 is again to be noted.
POINT V.
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

The respondent contends that this instruction does
not state the law in that it contains words to the effect
that if it is found that defendant is suffering from dia-
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betes, a fact which is admitted, it is improper for him to
operate an automobile and that he must be held liable in
this case. In support of his contention that this instruction should have been given appellant, refers to and cites
Williams v. Frohock (Florida) 114 So. 2d 221, and the
recited facts of this case include the following: "The
defendant had suffered loss of consciousness several
times before, but never while driving." For this reason,
that case does not conform to the case at bar and must be
distinguished. The transcript in this case discloses that
the evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that defendant
and respondent had suffered minor reactions in the past,
all of which had been readily controlled and none of which
had resulted in unconsciousness. (Tr. 135, 136, 140, 141,
155, 156, 166, 208) It is further to be noted that defendant
had driven extensively and had held a chauffeurs license
for a considerable period of time and had never had any
prior difficulty driving. (Tr. 167, 174, 189, 190, 195, 208)
Authorities cited by appellant must be distinguished
on the grounds that prior occurances of a similar nature
were found to be sufficient as a matter of fact to have
given warning to defendant on the basis of which he
should have known he was, or might be, an unsafe person
to operate an automobile. The subject of foreseeability
was specifically covered in the Court's instructions, particularly instructions No. 9 and 10, and, at the very least,
the facts in this case were certainly sufficient to justify a
jury finding that the accident was unavoidable on the
part of defendant.
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CONCLUSION
Viewing the facts in light most favorable to defendant, the prevailing party in the lower Court, it seems
clear that this court must conclude that the jury properly
returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant on the basis of the accident being unavoidable
on his part and not in any way caused by or resulting
from his negligence. The Court carefully and properly
instructed the jury on the applicable law, setting it forth
in clear and concise fashion, and certainly including the
basic elements of negligence and unavoidable accident on
the basis of which the jury made its determination.
The essential elements of appellant's requested instructions as they properly stated the law were incorporated and embodied in the instructions of the Court. Certainly it cannot be reasonably argued that this Court
should reverse the findings of fact made by the jury and,
based upon what appellant claims to be preponderance
of the evidence, award a verdict to appellant.
The facts are more than adequate to support the
jury's verdict based upon the law as properly recited by
the court in its instructions.
Respondent therefore contends that the verdict of
the jury in the lower Court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CARMAN E. KIPP
KIPP & CHARLIER
Attorney for Respondent

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

